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Kalis et al. (2013) provide a lucid and
useful discussion of options and option
generation, and argue persuasively that
these constructs can be instrumental in
our understanding of decision making. I
cannot agree more, but we must not be
confused: Kalis et al. tell us what option
generation is, but not how options are gen-
erated. To make progress, we must now
build on these concepts to phrase the ques-
tions and specify the requirements that a
cognitive model must fulfill; we need to
embody our insights and hypotheses about
the cognitive mechanisms into compu-
tational, and preferably also algorithmic,
models. This will force us to bring into the
open our implicit assumptions and postu-
lates and will allow us to test hypotheses,
to derive predictions and to plan experi-
ments targeted at filling the gaps in our
understanding.
As an illustration of the issue at hand,
consider the definition by Kalis et al.
of options as “representations of candi-
dates for goal-directed actions.” A model
based on this definition must include an
internal representation of actions and of
goals, of the relevant aspects of the world
with which the agent may interact, and
these interactions’ predicted outcomes.
This representation must support option
generation, which requires an algorithm
that can access the world representation,
perhaps accepting as input the momentary
state of the agent, and produce meaningful
sequences of actions.
Representations and algorithms suit-
able for this purpose have been proposed
in the past (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2009;
Dayan, 2012). In particular, we (Kolodny
et al., in review, in preparation) pro-
pose that such a representation should
take the form of a hierarchical directed
graph, whose vertices represent signif-
icant units in various modalities—for
example, objects, actions, or locations—
and whose edges represent probabilistic
associations among them. Such a rep-
resentation lends itself in a straightfor-
ward manner to option generation: the
agent can generate and run “internal
simulations” by probabilistically following
trajectories along the graph’s edges, each
trajectory representing what the agent per-
ceives as an optional sequence of events
and actions in the world. Vertices in
the graph are assigned value, providing
necessary data for the decision-making
process.
This approach allows us to address
the questions raised by Kalis et al.:
how might constraints in the option
generation process be applied? What
can account for differences among indi-
viduals? It also leads us to recognize
other unknowns that may go unno-
ticed unless an algorithmic solution is
sought. Some such questions are: What
is represented by the agent? What objects
in the world should be tracked and
what actions do they afford? How are
these organized? It may be difficult to
answer these questions, but answering
them is crucially important for under-
standing option generation and deci-
sion making, as well as other cognitive
processes.
Our modeling must be based on
insights, derived from experimentation,
with the two constantly influencing and
inspiring one another. I would like to
note two methodological pitfalls that
we must be wary of. The first is the
potential confusion between descriptions
and explanations: naming a phenomenon
sometimes creates an illusion that it is
better understood (McDermott, 1981).
For example, individual differences in the
hypothesized personality trait “openness
to experience” may lead us to won-
der, as Kalis et al. suggest, about differ-
ences among individuals in constraints
on option generation; we must, how-
ever, bear in mind that our understand-
ing of the cognitive processes behind
this personality trait remains as scarce as
our understanding of the option gener-
ation process. Linking one unknown to
another is intriguing, but even if a link
is found, we would still be short of an
explanation.
The second pitfall is in the implicit
assumptions behind, or the suggestive
nature of, the questions we ask. For exam-
ple, asking “What determines whether
options are generated from memory,
through automatic perceptual processes,
or by creative cognition?” might suggest
that these three options are distinct cog-
nitive processes. Even if we do not intend
to suggest so, and if the fallacy of this
assumption is currently clear to most read-
ers, our discourse may shape our thoughts
and with time this clarity might be lost.
Similarly, our choice of exploration space
might channel us toward a specific, per-
haps incorrect, conclusion. For example,
Kalis et al. exclude what seem to be “auto-
mated” choices of action from the scope
of exploration of decision making. Such
a research agenda is not very likely to
allow us to reach the conclusion that
the same cognitive processes underlie all
action choices, even though that might
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be the case1. An exploration of the full
range of situations in which an action
is carried out, using the same concepts
and practices to analyze all of them, is
likely to provide us with the unbiased data
that we need to infer their underlying
processes.
An important lesson can be learned
from the type of definitions used in the
study of animal behavior, where we are
constantly reminded that we have no
direct access to the cognitive “black box”
of our subjects. This is the case with
human subjects as well, despite the illu-
sion to the contrary (reinforced by our
own consciousness and the possibility of
debriefing subjects, for example). It is
instrumental to base our questions and
definitions on directly observable criteria,
and to phrase them in terms that do not
1It is ironic that the example that Kalis et al. provide
for an “automatic” action—the tendency to auto-
matically read a written word which we are pre-
sented with—is actually, as they note, quite arguable,
as multilingual readers clearly do need to apply a
decision-making process in order to read a word
successfully.
include cognitive elements or processes, as
these are themselves the objects of explo-
ration (Heyes, 1994; Hoppitt and Laland,
2008).
Kalis et al. offer applicable definitions
and insights into the nature of option
generation and its critical role in decision
making. I believe that these, coupled with
a principled study paradigm and explicit
construction of candidate cognitive mod-
els, may lead us to a better understanding
of our selves.
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